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Hume on Representation, Reason and
Motivation
Rachel Cohon and David Owen
Part One: Introduction
In a well known passage, Hume says:
A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of
existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders
it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am
actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a
reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more
than five foot high. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can
be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction
consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those
objects, which they represent. (T 415)
The passage occurs in Book 2, Part 3, Section 3, "Of the influencing
motives of the will." Let us call it "The Representation Argument." Very
roughly, the argument maintains that since passions have no representative
function, they cannot be opposed to or by reason. The same argument, slightly
enlarged to include actions and volitions as well as passions, occurs
43 pages later, in Book 3, Part 1, section 1, "Moral distinctions not
deriv'd from reason." Hume there says it serves two purposes. It proves
directly "that actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to
reason...; and it proves the same truth more indirectly, by shewing us,
that as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by
contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of the distinction
betwixt moral good and evil, which are found to have that influence."
In spite of the obvious centrality of The Representation Argument,
and its apparently clear and unequivocal expression in two places, there
are at least two prima facie problems in taking it at face value. 1) The
first premise seems to be in conflict with the fact that the passions
apparently do represent things to us. Anger, according to the account
developed by Hume in Book 2, is typically directed; the blind, undirected
anger mentioned in the above formulation of The Representation Argument
seems atypical, degenerate and in need of explanation with reference to
the more typical, directed, central case. Given this difficulty, why does
Hume claim that passions do not represent? 2)The Representation Argument's
indirect role, in helping to show that reason, or any conclusion of reason,
doesn't motivate (that being the unique role of the passions), seems to
be in tension with the important Book 1, Part 3, Section 10, "Of the influence
of belief." There, an important feature of beliefs, as opposed to the
merely conceived ideas of the imagination, is that beliefs have an influence
on passions and actions. Why, then, does Hume say that reason doesn't
motivate? In this paper, we hope to solve these problems. First, we will
establish that in Book 1 Hume shows that impressions do not represent;
that is the role of ideas. The main premise of the Representation Argument
will then be seen as, at least in part, just a consequence of this general
truth. We will then offer an explanation of how Hume can account for the
directedness of the passions, in spite of the fact that they are "original
existences." In light of this account, we will clarify the relation
between reason and motivation, and make some general claims about the
scope of the claim that moral distinctions are not based on reason.
Part Two: Impressions, Ideas and Representation
Locke characterized the term ‘idea’ as "whatsoever is the Object
of the Understanding when a Man thinks". This is general enough,
but he also thinks of many ideas, including ideas of sense, as being essentially
representational, serving as signs for something beyond themselves. For
instance he says "‘Tis therefore the actual receiving of Ideas
from without, that gives us notice of the Existence of other Things, and
makes us know, that something doth exist at that time without us, which
causes that Idea in us" (Essay,, p. 630 (4.11.2)). Ideas,
as received in sensation, are for Locke essentially representational:
"since the Things, the Mind contemplates, are none of them, besides
it self, present to the Understanding, ‘tis necessary that something else,
as a Sign or Representation of the thing it considers, should be present
to it: and these are Ideas." (pp.720-721 (4.21.4))
By contrast, Hume, from the very first sentence of the Treatise,
distinguishes all "the perceptions of the human mind... into two
distinct kinds": impressions and ideas (T 1). Implicitly in the Treatise,
and explicitly in the first Enquiry, Hume argues that by missing
this distinction, Locke missed the point about the innateness controversy.
Once it is established that all ideas are derived from impressions, it
follows, if by 'innate' we mean "original or copied from no precedent
perception," that "all our impressions are innate, and our ideas
not innate." (Enquiry, p. 22) That is to say, impressions
are "original or copied from no precedent perception", while
"ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions, from which
they are derived, and which they represent." (T 7) To say that impressions
are not copies of other, precedent perceptions is not to deny that they
have causes. Nor is it yet to deny that they might resemble, copy or represent
their causes. But it certainly sets the stage for such a denial, and at
the very least should prepare us for the claim that a "passion is
an original existence" (T 415).
Let us turn to Hume’s discussion of how it is that one class of perceptions,
ideas, can be derived from, resemble, and represent another class, impressions.
One of the more important points established by Hume in the very first
section of the Treatise is the Priority Principle: "That all our
simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions,
which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent." (T
4) This important claim, which Hume describes as "the first principle...
in the science of human nature" (T 7), is explicitly,
if not solely, about representation. The representation of impressions
by ideas is mentioned frequently throughout this section, and it is not
there suggested that impressions themselves might represent something
else.
The Priority Principle is in part made up of the Correspondence Rule:
there is a one to one correspondence between simple ideas and impressions.
Hume establishes this rule of correspondence between simple ideas and
impressions by simple observation, and realizes "'tis impossible to prove
by a particular enumeration." Instead, he issues a challenge to anyone
denying the rule to come up with a counterexample. He then turns to his
main task: the tracing of the connections, especially the causal connections,
between impressions and ideas. Hume says that "The full examination of
this question is the subject of the present treatise;" (T 4), an important
claim. His method in the application of the science of human nature to
the subjects treated in this work will be the tracing of connections between
impressions and ideas. But at this early stage, Hume is concerned only
to establish the Priority Principle. Hume’s attempt comes in two stages,
and the argument is summed up as follows:
The constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is a convincing
proof, that the one are the causes of the other; and this priority of
the impressions is an equal proof, that our impressions are the causes
of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions. (T 5)
Simple impressions and ideas come in resembling pairs, and as the
former cause the latter, the latter represent the former. Ideas represent,
and what they represent is impressions. Impressions don’t, it appears,
represent at all. At least, they don’t represent other perceptions of
the mind. If they are to represent something else (external objects, for
example), and if they are to represent these things in the way ideas represent
impressions, then at least two things must be true: 1)they must be caused
by these other things, and 2)they must resemble, perhaps even be copies
of, these causes. But Hume shows little interest in the causes of impressions,
at least of the impressions of sensations. At 1.3.5 he says:
As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate
cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and ‘twill
always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately
from the objects, or are produc’d by the creative power of the mind, or
are deriv’d from the author of our being. (T 84)
And at 2.1.1, he says:
Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without
any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of
the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects
to the external organs. (T275)
There is a host of possibilities for the causes of sensation: Hume has
ruled out only that they are other perceptions of the mind (that is why
he here calls them "original impressions"). But we will never be
in a position to know what in fact their causes are.
One of the reasons Hume is reluctant to pursue the question of the
causes of impressions of sensation is that he knows, and perhaps knows
in advance, that we are not going to get what we want, if what we want
as causes are external objects that resemble the impressions they occasion.
This is clear at least as early as 1.2.6:
Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since
all ideas are deriv’d from something antecedently present to the mind;
it follows, that ‘tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form
an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.
(T 67)
We think we can conceive of external objects different from but
resembling the impressions of sensation they cause, but this is a mistake.
The content of all our ideas comes from impressions. We cannot even conceive
what it would be like for a perception of the mind to resemble something
that is not a perception of the mind. To paraphrase Berkeley, nothing
can be like a perception of the mind but another perception of the mind.
Impressions and ideas resemble each other. But ideas are derived from
impressions, not the other way around. So ideas can represent, but impressions
cannot.
It remains true of course that we (or at least philosophers) believe
that impressions of sensation are caused by and resemble, and hence represent,
external objects. And Hume himself sometimes speaks that way, e.g.. at
T 67 and 84. Ordinary people have the simpler belief that impressions
simply are external objects. Both beliefs, especially the philosopher’s,
must be explained. And this Hume attempts to do in 1.4.2. The difficult
details of Hume’s explanation are beyond the scope of this paper; but
it is worth quickly summarizing his reasons for thinking that, as is predictable
from 1.2.6, the philosopher’s belief in distinct existence comes not from
sense, nor is it founded on reason. For sense to "produce the opinion
of a distinct existence" which causes the impressions which resemble
it, or to "offer it to the mind as represented," it must "present
both an object and an image." (T 191-93). But this is an impossibility.
Nor can we reason from the existence of an impression to a belief in a
distinct object which causes it:
But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it follows
that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect between
different perceptions, but can never observe it between perceptions and
objects. ‘Tis impossible, therefore, that from the existence or any of
the qualities of the former, we can ever form any conclusion concerning
the existence of the latter, or ever satisfy our reason in this particular.
(T 212)
Indeed, Hume describes the philosophical hypothesis "of the double
existence of perceptions and objects" as a "monstrous offspring"
(T 215).
Some perceptions of the mind, ideas, represent other perceptions,
impressions. Contrary to our initial inclination to believe otherwise,
it turns out that impressions, at least impressions of sensation, don’t
represent. So when Hume says, "A passion is an original existence,...
and contains not any representative quality" (T 415), we should hardly
be surprised. Let us look briefly at the differences between impressions
of sensation and impressions of reflection. At 1.1.2, Hume says that an
impression of sensation "arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes."
(T 7) But an impression of reflection "is derived in a great measure from
ideas" (T 7). We receive an impression of pleasure or pain, from which
an idea is taken. And when this idea "returns upon the soul, [it] produces
the new impression of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly
be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it." (T 8) Much
the same division is made at 2.1.1, where the main division is between
original and secondary impressions. The former include "the impressions
of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures", while the latter include
"the passions, and other emotions resembling them." (T 275) Hume's use
of the terms "original" and "secondary" are instructive here. By "original",
Hume means something like: part of the bedrock of human nature, which
can't be explained by appeal to prior causes. Hume doesn't deny that they
have "natural and physical causes" (T 275), but only that such causes,
presumably having to do with animal spirits etc., are irrelevant to their
nature as original impressions. Secondary impressions, by contrast, have
as their cause an idea or another impression. And this causal story is
part of what it is for these impressions to be impressions of reflection.
So, when Hume says that a "passion is an original existence" (T 415),
he is not using "original" in the same sense as "original (vs. secondary)
impression". In the latter case, "original" means something like "from
unknown causes". Passions are secondary, not original impressions. Rather,
when Hume says that passions are original existences he means that, even
though we know the causal origins of a passion, the passion produced is
not a copy of its cause in the way an idea is a copy of the impression
from which it is derived. Part of what it is to be an impression is to
be an original, that from which copies are made. Passions, like all impressions,
are not copies of anything else.
This still leaves us with the problem of the directedness of anger.
Typically, I am angry at someone, and not just possessed by blind rage.
But Hume has no problem in accounting for this. Many of the passions,
such as pride and humility, love and hatred, take the self or another
as their object. But a passion such as hatred doesn't itself represent
another; rather it is associated with an idea of another, and Hume has
no problem with ideas representing, as we have seen. Hume explicitly likens
anger to hatred in always taking another as its object: " 'Tis the same
case with hatred. We may be mortified by our own faults and follies; but
never feel any anger or hatred, except from the injuries of others." (T
329-330)
Part Three: Beliefs, Reason and Motivation
In 1.3.10, "Of the influences of belief," Hume introduces the subjects
of motivation to action and the role that belief might play in motivation.
We should remember that beliefs are the product of causal reasoning and,
to put the matter crudely, are distinguished from ideas of the imagination,
or merely conceived ideas, by their greater force and vivacity. Hume says
"There is implanted in the human mind a perception of pain and pleasure,
as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions. But pain
and pleasure have two ways of making their appearance in the mind; of
which the one has effects very different from the other." (T 118) That
is to say, pain and pleasure may occur either as impressions or as ideas.
The former "always actuate the soul, and that in the highest degree."
But ideas have a variable effect. By and large, it is only beliefs "which
produce in a lesser degree the same effect with those impressions, which
are immediately present to the senses and perception" (T 119). So "[t]he
effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with
our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions. This
effect it can only have by making an idea approach an impression in force
and vivacity." (T 119) Impressions, especially impressions of pain and
pleasure, influence our actions by virtue of their force and vivacity.
By and large ideas, having much less force and vivacity, do not. Beliefs,
being ideas with more force and vivacity, approximate impressions in their
motivational strength. But beliefs are, in part, the conclusions of causal
reasoning. So the results of reasoning can have motivational force. At
this stage, we make only these two observations about this point. First,
Hume seems to be committed only to the limited claim that beliefs about
pain or pleasure may be the conclusion of reasoning and
may motivate. He is silent on the prospect of other beliefs motivating.
Second, the point about beliefs' influence on passions or actions is not
developed here by Hume. Indeed, he spends the bulk of this section discussing
the effects of beliefs on the imagination.
We must now see how these remarks about the influence of belief can be
made consistent with Hume's famous thesis of the motivational impotence
of reason. The key to the explanation lies in the Representation Argument.
Here is its structure:
1. Passions have no representative quality.
2. Only what represents real relations and matters of fact, and so can
agree or disagree with them (T458), can be contrary or conformable to
reason.
3. Therefore passions cannot be contrary or conformable to reason.
We have seen that the controversial first premise is really just
a consequence of passions being impressions rather than ideas. If we grant
Hume the second premise, the conclusion follows: passions (and volitions
and actions) cannot be contrary to reason or conformable to it. Passions
and volitions cannot be contrary to reason because they are impressions
and hence do not represent. Actions, whether or not they are impressions,
are at any rate not ideas, so the same applies.
It is hard to see straight off how an argument proving that passions
and actions cannot represent something else by resembling it, and in this
sense cannot conform to reason, is supposed to show that reason alone
cannot motivate actions. Yet this is clearly what Hume intends it to show.
He introduces the Representation Argument to prove that "reason alone
can never be a motive to any action of the will" (T 413). In 3.1.1 he
says the Argument proves "that reason is perfectly inert, and can never
either prevent or produce any action or affection" (T 458). And he uses
this to show, both directly and indirectly, that moral distinctions are
not derived from reason.
The famous indirect argument that moral distinctions are not derived
from reason is formulated several times; at its first appearance it looks
like this:
1. "...morals... have an influence on the actions and affections..."
2. "...reason alone... can never have any such influence."
3. "...it follows, that [morals] cannot be deriv'd from reason" (T 457).
On the next page the premise about the inertia of reason reads this way:
"...reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting
or approving of it..." This premise that reason alone cannot produce action,
which we will call the Inertia Thesis, seems to be a (negative) causal
claim. The conclusion of the Representation Argument, from which it is
supposedly derived, is that passions and actions are not accurate or inaccurate
copies of any other reality which they purport to represent, which does
not seem to be at all about what reason alone can cause. Hume clearly
thinks he can move from the one claim to the other in a single step. How?
We should note that the Inertia Thesis does not say that beliefs
alone cannot produce passions or actions, but rather that reason
alone cannot. This may seem to be compatible with the motivational efficacy
attributed to beliefs about likely pleasures and pains in 1.3.10. But
such beliefs are conclusions of causal reasoning. So if these claims are
to be compatible, we must be able to explain the following apparent conflict.
Suppose that as the result of a bit of causal reasoning I believe that
driving under the influence may well cause me pain, and this belief gives
rise to an aversion which moves me to refuse the next drink. This causal
sequence is an instance of belief motivating action in just the way described
in 1.3.10. But it also seems to be an instance of causal reason alone
motivating action, and so just the sort of thing ruled out by the Inertia
Thesis. True, the passion of aversion intervenes in the causal sequence,
but this is no help; for in most versions of the Inertia Thesis Hume says
that reason alone cannot produce passions or volitions either (T 457,
8). So we must also explain why this causal sequence, a sequence countenanced
by Hume, does not count as a case of reason alone producing passion, in
contradiction to the Inertia Thesis.
One enticing way to explain both how the Representation Argument
supports the Inertia Thesis and how the Inertia Thesis is compatible with
"Of the influence of belief" is to deny that the thesis that reason is
inert is a causal claim, as it appears to be. Since, as the Representation
Argument shows, the products of reason are ideas which represent their
originals, perhaps what we are to conclude from the Representation Argument
is that the only products of reason are conclusions of reason,
the outcomes of demonstrative or causal inferences. Thus the claim that
reason alone cannot produce action is an ontological -- almost a logical
-- thesis, rather than a causal one: passions, volitions, and actions
cannot be the conclusions of bits of reasoning, because they are of the
wrong ontological category, "realities" rather than representations that
can be true or false. The Inertia Thesis in the indirect argument should
then be understood to say that passions and actions cannot be entailed
by premises or derived by inference, or (more broadly) that they cannot
be produced by the recognition that they would be accurate representations.
If being produced by reason alone is being produced as a conclusion, then
of course the causal sequence from causal inference to belief about the
danger of drunk driving to aversion and thence to refusing the drink does
not count as production of action by reason alone. Reason's work is done
once the belief is formed. The next step (from belief to passion) is not
a piece of reasoning but mere causation, so this is not production by
reason alone.
However, if what Hume means by the Inertia Thesis is that passions
and actions cannot be conclusions of inferences, he equivocates in the
indirect argument. Recall what it says:
1. Reason alone cannot produce passions or actions.
2. (Judgments of) moral merit and demerit can produce passions and actions.
Therefore, moral distinctions are not the offspring of reason alone.
(T458)
If we interpret 'reason alone' as we have so far, the first premise says:
1'. Reason alone cannot produce passions or actions as conclusions.
But of course, the second premise does not say that moral distinctions
can produce passions and actions as conclusions. (This is
not how moral distinctions produce them, and in any case they cannot be
conclusions, since they are original existences.) The productive influence
of morality on passions and actions is merely causal. That is the equivocation.
The danger of equivocation arises because the indirect argument apparently
depends for its validity upon some sort of transitivity, some principle
of the form "If A alone produces B and B (alone?) produces C, then A alone
produces C." For the argument has the following structure:
1. A alone cannot produce C.
2. B produces C.
3. Therefore A is not the source of B.
These premises entail the conclusion only if the relation "produces"
or "is the source of" is transitive. But with the equivocation, transitivity
is lost.
So, simply reading the Inertia Thesis as saying that only representations
can be the conclusions of bits of reasoning (a corollary of Premise 2
of the Representation Argument) makes the indirect argument invalid. Perhaps
Hume does equivocate in this way. However, we will propose a reasonable
alternative reading of the indirect argument which does better for Hume.
Part Four: Reason as a Kind of Cause, and Reason Alone
Let us return to the plausible supposition that the Inertia Thesis is
really a causal thesis. This leaves us with at least two problems to solve.
First, how is such a causal claim supported by the Representation Argument?
Second, the causal reading of the indirect argument presupposes the principle
of causal transitivity. This principle apparently entails that if reason
alone causes the cause of an action, this counts as reason alone causing
action. In our case of refusing the drink, since causal reasoning produces
the belief about pain, which causes aversion, which causes action, in
light of the principle of transitivity it looks as if reason alone causes
action. But then the motivational efficacy of beliefs in the prospect
of pleasure or pain, as described in 1.3.10, is incompatible with the
Inertia Thesis, that reason alone cannot cause action. For the sole difference
cited in 1.3.10 between ideas of pleasure and pain that motivate action
and those that do not is that the former are beliefs; there is no indication
that they are aided in their motivational efficacy by any causally-independent
passion or state.
This leads us to a third challenge. Merely avoiding the equivocation
by invoking causation in both premises is not enough to insure that the
argument is valid. Since the argument depends for its validity on the
tacit assumption of the principle of the transitivity of causation, it
succeeds only in cases where that principle holds. There are cases where
the principle holds and cases where it does not. For example, in this
argument, the transitivity of causation seems to hold and complete the
inference:
1. Determination alone cannot make me rich.
2. Good luck alone can.
3. Therefore, determination alone cannot produce good luck.
It does seem that if determination alone could produce good luck, then
in a certain sense, determination would be sufficient to make me rich.
But the following argument, seemingly of the same form, fails:
1. Being indicted, alone, cannot give Jones a headache.
2. Tension, alone, can give Jones a headache.
3. Therefore, being indicted, alone, cannot cause tension.
The premises are at least plausible, but the conclusion seems nonetheless
false, and a non sequitur. This is because we do not naturally insert
the principle of transitivity as a tacit premise, and indeed, that principle
appears false here. We are not inclined to say that if being indicted
alone could cause tension and tension alone could cause headache (in Jones),
then being indicted alone would be sufficient to make Jones' head hurt.
An interpretation that validates the indirect argument must construe the
principle of transitivity in such a way that it is true, presumably by
narrowing it so as to exclude this type of case.
To deal with these problems, we have to reconsider what "reason alone"
means. It has been usual to interpret this as "beliefs, without passions
or sentiments." This is incompatible with 1.3.10. When reason is contrasted
with the passions, or with the moral sentiments, Hume is contrasting operations
of the understanding, which deal only with ideas, with those operations
that also concern the sentiments. So reason alone, we suggest, is reasoning
considered apart from any passions and any feelings of pleasure or
pain.. On this view, reason is a kind of cause, to be sure, but one
whose effect is truths (T 180), and falsehoods when other causes intervene,
but in any case ideas rather than "realities." Reason alone, so understood,
can give rise only to representations.
The Representation Argument is indeed offered as support for the Inertia
Thesis in at least two places (T 415, T 458). The Representation Argument
reasserts the claim about the nonrepresentational nature of the passions,
characterizing them as original existences. But reason is concerned with
the relations of ideas, relations that hold either between ideas themselves,
or between an idea and some "real existence and matter of fact"
(T 458). We can reason about passions, just the way we can reason
about any real existence. But we can only reason with ideas, that
is, with entities capable of representing other realities. "Now 'tis evident
that our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any
such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat
in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions,
and actions" (T 458). But, the Representation Argument continues, from
this claim about passions, representations, and realities, it immediately
follows that passions cannot be conformable to or opposed by reason: "
'Tis impossible, therefore, they can be pronounced either true or false,
and be either contrary or conformable to reason" (T 458). Reason produces
only ideas or representations. But passions, volitions and actions are
"real existences" or "original facts and realities, compleat in themselves."
Hence they can never be the outcome of reason. Nor can they be conformable
to or opposed by any outcome of reason.
A creature with reason alone, in the sense we are suggesting Hume intended,
would be one who had Humean reason but no passions or feelings of pleasure
or pain. Such a being would, of course, come to have some beliefs. But
such a being could not have ideas of the passions, nor of pleasure or
pain, since he could not experience the originals. Consequently he could
not form any beliefs about them, even if his causal reasoning were perfect.
Understood in this way, reason alone does not produce any beliefs
about the prospects of pain or pleasure either. Reason cannot produce
impressions, nor can it produce any new ideas (T 157). Thus, reason alone
cannot produce the one kind of belief that on Hume's account is causally
linked with passion and action.
Of course, in a being also possessed of feelings of pleasure and pain,
and of the capacity to desire the one and shun the other, reason plays
an important role in the production of beliefs about the sources of pleasures
and pains, and these beliefs, in turn, cause passions and action. But
such beliefs will not be the products of reason alone, even in
that being, for in forming such beliefs it would also need to make use
of ideas not available to reason alone. This makes the inertia of reason
alone compatible with the motivational efficacy of certain beliefs. Beliefs
of the motivating kinds are ones that reason alone cannot produce.
The indirect argument against moral rationalism then must be understood
to say this:
1. Reason alone, given what it is, cannot give rise to any actions, nor
to any beliefs of the kind that in fact cause action.
2. Moral judgments do cause actions.
3. Therefore reason alone does not give rise to moral judgments.
So, even if moral judgments should turn out to be beliefs, they will
not be beliefs of the kind that are produced by reason alone. To form
such beliefs one needs to make use of passions, or feelings of pleasure
or pain, or both.
The argument nonetheless still relies on the principle of transitivity,
which is not generally valid. But the principle is valid on our understanding
of "reason alone." Recall the argument about determination and wealth:
1. Determination alone cannot make me rich.
2. Good luck alone can.
3. Therefore, determination alone cannot produce good luck.
"X alone can produce Y" seems to mean here that X is sufficient to produce
Y without the contribution of any independent causal factor. If, in this
sense, X alone (by itself) can cause Y, and Y by itself can cause Z, then
it seems that X by itself can cause Z, even though it does so by way of
Y, for Y is entirely within X's causal control. Y is not an independent
contributor to the process. Thus, if determination by itself could
produce good luck for me (if Mark Twain's aphorism, "The harder I work,
the luckier I get," were a literally true causal claim), and good luck
by itself can make me rich, then determination alone could make me rich,
in this sense of "alone." Since determination is not sufficient to make
me wealthy without the contribution of some other causal factor not caused
by my determination, then it follows that, sadly, good luck is not under
the causal control of determination. This is an analog to the indirect
argument as we interpret it. If reason alone could produce moral distinctions,
which we know can, alone, produce passions and actions, then reason alone
would be capable of producing passions and actions. Since reason cannot
produce passions or actions without the additional contribution of something
not caused by reason alone, it follows that moral distinctions are not
under the causal control of reason alone.
In the argument about tension and headaches, however, this is not
the sense of "alone" in virtue of which we take the first premise to be
true. Recall that argument:
1. Being indicted, alone, cannot give someone a headache.
2. Tension, alone, can give someone a headache.
3. Therefore, being indicted, alone, cannot cause tension.
Were we to assert the first premise, we would presumably mean that being
indicted does not cause a headache without an intermediate step: there
are other things happening between the indictment and the throbbing of
the head, such as tension in the neck or a reduction or increase in the
blood flow. However, this is different from the sense of "alone" that
made the former arguments valid. The sense used here does not support
the principle of transitivity. From the facts that X causes Y without
intermediary, and Y causes Z without intermediary, it does not, of course,
follow that X causes Z without intermediary. We propose that what Hume
means by "reason alone" in the indirect argument is thus "reason understood
apart from pleasure, pain, and the passions, and without independent causal
contribution from anything which reason cannot cause;" but not "reason
directly, not operating through any intermediate products."
Part Five: Conclusion
In this paper we presented the Representation Argument as a consequence
of a more general thesis about impressions, ideas and representation.
Our interpretation of the indirect argument against moral rationalism
treats the Inertia Premise as causal, thus avoiding the equivocation problem.
It also sees that premise as following from the Representation Argument.
This requires a new reading of "reason alone": reason alone is reason
functioning in isolation from any passions, sentiments, or feelings of
pleasure and pain, either in the form of impressions or ideas, and apart
from anything that reason itself (so understood) cannot cause. This insures
that the indirect argument relies only on the true version of the principle
of transitivity. Our reading of the Inertia Premise is entirely compatible
with 1.3.10: beliefs about pleasure and pain can motivate, but such beliefs
cannot enter into arguments of reason alone. One consequence of our interpretation,
which we mention here only in passing, is that there is nothing in the
indirect argument to support a non-cognitivist reading of Hume. Moral
judgments may well be beliefs for Hume. It is just that they are not the
sort of beliefs that can be reached by reason alone.
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